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D. Haynes
The MITRE Corporation
J. Fitzgerald-McKay
Department of Defense
L. Lorenzin
Pulse Secure
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Endpoint Posture Collection Profile
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Abstract

This document specifies the Endpoint Posture Collection Profile, which describes the best practices for the application of IETF, TNC, and ISO/IEC data models, protocols, and interfaces to support the on-going collection and communication of endpoint posture to a centralized server where it can be stored and made available to other tools. This document is an extension of the Trusted Computing Group's Endpoint Compliance Profile Version 1.0 specification [ECP].

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1. Introduction

The Endpoint Posture Collection Profile (EPCP) builds on prior work from the IETF NEA WG, the IETF NETCONF WG, IETF NETMOD WG, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Trusted Network Communications [TNC] WG, and the International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission Joint Technical Committee (JTC) 1, Subcommittee (SC) 7, WG 21 (ISO/IEC JTC 1, SC7, WG21) to describe the best practices for the collection and communication of posture information from network-connected endpoints to a centralized server.

This document focuses on reducing the security exposure of a network by enabling event-driven posture collection, standardized querying of additional posture information as needed, and the communication of that data to a centralized server where it can be made available to other components. Thus, eliminating the need for redundant collection and agents on endpoints. Future revisions of this document may include support for the collection of posture information from other endpoint types as well as a standardized interface for storing and querying data in repositories among other capabilities. Additional information about this future work can be found in Section 6 of this document.

To support the collection of posture information from new endpoint types, this document is organized such that it first provides a high-level overview of EPCP as well as its abstract architectural components and transactions that will be realized by implementations (Section 3). This is followed by individual sections that discuss the best practices for specific implementations of the EPCP for a given endpoint type (e.g., traditional, network device, etc.) along with any extensions for supported use cases (software asset management, vulnerability management, etc.).

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. This specification does not distinguish blocks of informative comments and normative requirements. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, note that lower case instances of must, should, etc. do not indicate normative requirements.

Furthermore, this document uses terms as defined in [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology] unless otherwise specified.

3. Endpoint Posture Collection Profile

The EPCP describes how IETF, TCG, and ISO/IEC data models, protocols, and interfaces can be used to support the posture assessment of endpoints on a network. This profile does not generate new data models, protocols, or interfaces; rather, it offers best practices for a full end-to-end solution for posture assessment, as well as a fresh perspective on how existing standards can be leveraged against vulnerabilities. Rationale for the EPCP solution as well as the supported and non-supported use cases is available in Appendix A and Appendix B respectively.

The EPCP makes it possible to perform posture assessments against all network-connected endpoints by:

1. uniquely identifying the endpoint;
2. collecting and evaluating posture based on data from the endpoint (asset management, software asset management, vulnerability management, and configuration management);
3. creating a secure, authenticated, confidential channel between the endpoint and the posture manager;
4. enabling the endpoint to notify the posture manager about changes to its configuration;
5. enabling the posture manager to request information about the configuration of the endpoint; and
6. storing the posture information in a repository linked to the identifier for the endpoint.

Furthermore, the EPCP aims to support data storage and data sharing capabilities to make the collected posture information available to authorized parties and components in support of other processes (analytic, access control, remediation, reporting, etc.).

3.1. Components

To perform posture assessment, data storage, and data sharing, the EPCP defines several components. Some of these components reside on the target endpoint. Others reside on a posture manager that manages communications with the target endpoint and stores the target endpoint's posture information in a repository.


```
*           | Administrative Interface           | *
*           | and API                           | *
*           +-----+                         + *
*
*****FUTURE WORK*****
```

Figure 1: EPCP Components

3.1.1. Endpoint

An endpoint is defined in [RFC6876]. In the EPCP, the endpoint is monitored by the enterprise and is the target of posture assessments. To support these posture assessments, posture information is collected via a posture collection engine.

3.1.1.1. Posture Collection Engine

The posture collection engine is located on the target endpoint and receives queries from a posture collection manager. It also sends collected posture information to the posture manager where it can be sanity checked and stored in the repository. The posture collection engine also contains a capability that sets up exchanges between the target endpoint and posture manager. This capability makes the posture collection engine responsible for performing the client-side portion of encryption handshakes, and for locating authorized posture managers with which to communicate.

3.1.2. Posture Manager

The posture manager is an endpoint that collects, validates, and enriches posture information received about a target endpoint. It also stores the posture information it receives in the repository where it can be evaluated. The posture manager does not evaluate the posture information.

3.1.2.1. Posture Collection Manager

A posture collection manager is a lightweight and extensible component that facilitates the coordination and execution of posture collection requests using collection mechanisms deployed across the enterprise. The posture collection manager may query and retrieve guidance from the repository to guide the collection of posture information from the target endpoint.

The posture collection manager also contains a capability that sets up exchanges between the target endpoint and the posture manager, and manages data sent to and from posture collection engine. It is also responsible for performing the server-side portion of encryption handshakes.

3.1.3. Repository

The repository hosts guidance, endpoint identification information, and posture information reported by target endpoints where it is made available to authorized components and persisted over a period of time set by the administrator. Information stored in the repository

will be accessible to authorized parties via a standard administrative interface as well as through a standardized API. The repository may be a standalone component or may be located on the posture manager. Furthermore, an implementation is not restricted to a single repository and may leverage several repositories to provide this functionality.

3.1.4. Evaluator

The evaluator assesses the posture status of a target endpoint by comparing collected posture information against the desired state of the target endpoint specified in guidance. The evaluator queries and retrieves the appropriate guidance from the repository as well as queries and retrieves the posture information required for the assessment from the repository. If the required posture information is not available in the repository, the evaluator may request the posture information from the posture collection manager, which will result in the collection of additional posture information from the target endpoint. This information is subsequently stored in the repository where it is made available to the evaluator and other components. The results of the assessment are stored in the repository where they are available to tools and administrators for follow-up actions, further evaluation, and historical purposes.

3.1.5. Orchestrator

The orchestrator provides a publish/subscribe interface for the repository so that infrastructure endpoints can subscribe to and receive published posture assessment results from the repository regarding endpoint posture changes.

3.1.6. Administrative Interface and API

The administrative interface allows administrators to query the repository and manage the endpoints and software used in the EPCP via the posture manager. Similarly, an API is necessary to allow infrastructure endpoints and software access to the information stored in the repository and to manage the endpoints and software used in the EPCP. The administrative interface and API provide authorized users, infrastructure endpoints, and software with the ability to query the repository for data, send commands to the posture collection managers requesting information from the associated posture collection engines residing on endpoints, and establish and update the policy that resides on the posture manager

3.2. Transactions

The following sections describe the transactions associated with the components of the EPCP architecture and may be provided in an implementation.

3.2.1. Provisioning

An endpoint is provisioned with one or more attributes that will serve as its unique identifier on the network as well as the components and data models necessary to interact with the posture manager. Examples of such identifiers include MAC addresses, serial numbers, hardware certificates compliant with [IEEE-802-1ar], and the identities of hardware cryptographic modules among others. Once provisioning is complete, the endpoint is deployed on the network. Over time, components and data models may need to be added to the endpoint or updated to support the collection needs of an enterprise.

3.2.2. Discovery and Validation

If necessary, the target endpoint finds and validates the posture manager. The posture collection engine on the target endpoint and posture collection manager on the posture manager complete an encryption handshake, during which endpoint identity information is exchanged.

3.2.3. Event Driven Collection

The posture assessment is initiated when the posture collector engine on the target endpoint notices that relevant posture information on the endpoint has changed. Then, the posture collection engine initiates a posture assessment information exchange with the posture collection manager.

3.2.4. Querying

The posture assessment is initiated by the posture collection manager. This can occur because:

1. policy states that a previous assessment has aged out or become invalid, or
2. the posture collection manager is alerted by a sensor or an administrator (via the posture manager's administrative interface) that an assessment must be completed

3.2.5. Data Storage

Once posture information is received by the posture manager, it is forwarded to the repository. The repository could be co-located with the posture manager, or there could be direct or brokered communication between the posture manager and the repository. The posture information is stored in the repository along with past posture information collected about the target endpoint.

3.2.6. Data Sharing

Because the target endpoint posture information was sent in standards-based data models over secure, standardized protocols, and then stored in a centralized repository linked to unique endpoint identifiers, authorized parties are able to access the posture information. Such authorized parties may include, but are not limited to, administrators or endpoint owners (via the posture manager's administrative interface), evaluators that access the repository directly, and orchestrators that rely on publish/subscribe communications with the repository.

4. IETF NEA EPCP Implementation for Traditional Endpoints

When EPCP is used, posture collectors running on the target endpoint gather posture information as changes occur on the endpoint. The data is aggregated by the posture broker client and forwarded to a posture manager, over a secure channel, via the posture transport client. Once received by the posture transport server on the posture manager, the posture information is directed by the posture broker server to the appropriate posture validators where it can be processed and stored in a repository. There the posture information can be used by other tools to carry out assessment tasks. Posture collectors can also be queried by posture validators to refresh posture information about the target endpoint or to ask a specific question about posture information. This is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: NEA Components

These requirements are written with a view to performing a posture assessment on an endpoint; as the EPCP grows and evolves, these requirements will be expanded to address issues that arise. Note that these requirements refer to defined components of the NEA architecture [RFC5209]. As with the NEA architecture, vendors have discretion as to how these NEA components map to separate pieces of software or endpoints.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the posture broker client and posture transport client components of the posture collection engine and the posture broker server and posture transport server components of the posture collection manager would likely need to be implemented by a single vendor because there are no standardized interfaces between the respective components and would not be interoperable.

Examples of the EPCP as implemented using the components from the NEA architecture are provided in Appendix C.

4.1. Endpoint Provisioning

An endpoint is provisioned with a machine certificate that will serve as its unique identifier on the network as well as the components necessary to interact with the posture manager. This includes a posture collection engine to manage requests from the posture manager and the posture collectors necessary to collect the posture information of importance to the enterprise. The endpoint is deployed on the network.

The target endpoint SHOULD authenticate to the posture manager using a machine certificate during the establishment of the outer tunnel achieved with the posture transport protocol defined in [RFC6876]. [IF-IMV] specifies how to pull an endpoint identifier out of a machine certificate. An endpoint identifier SHOULD be created in conformance with [IF-IMV] from a machine certificate sent via [RFC6876].

In the future, the identity could be a hardware certificate compliant with [IEEE-802-1ar]; ideally, this identifier SHOULD be associated with the identity of a hardware cryptographic module, in accordance with [IEEE-802-1ar], if present on the endpoint. The enterprise SHOULD stand up a certificate root authority; install its root certificate on endpoints and on the posture manager; and provision the endpoints and the posture manager with machine certificates. The target endpoint MAY authenticate to the posture manager using a combination of the machine account and password; however, this is less secure and not recommended.

4.2. Endpoint

The endpoint MUST conform to [RFC5793], which levies several requirements against the endpoint. An endpoint that complies with these requirements will be able to:

1. attempt to initiate a session with the posture manager if the posture makes a request to send an update to posture manager;
2. notify the posture collector if no PT-TLS session with the posture manager can be created;
3. notify the posture collector when a PT-TLS session is established; and
4. receive information from the posture collectors, forward this information to the posture manager via the posture collection engine.

4.2.1. Posture Collector

Any posture collector used in an EPCP solution MUST be conformant with the TCG TNC Integrity Measurement Collector interface [IF-IMC].

4.2.2. Posture Broker Client

The posture broker client MUST conform to [IF-IMC] to enable communications between the posture broker client and the posture collectors on the endpoint.

4.2.3. Posture Transport Client

The posture transport client MUST implement PT-TLS.

The posture transport client MUST support the use of machine certificates for TLS at each endpoint consistent with the requirements stipulated in [RFC6876] and [Server-Discovery].

The posture transport client MUST be able to locate an authorized posture manager, and switch to a new posture manager when required by the network, in conformance with [Server-Discovery].

4.3. Posture Manager

The posture manager MUST conform to all requirements in the [RFC5793].

4.3.1. Posture Validator

Any posture validator used in an EPCP solution MUST be conformant with the TCG TNC Integrity Measurement Verifier interface [IF-IMV].

4.3.2. Posture Broker Server

The posture broker server MUST conform to [IF-IMV]. Conformance to [IF-IMV] enables the posture broker server to obtain endpoint identity information from the posture transport server, and pass this information to any posture validators on the posture manager.

4.3.3. Posture Transport Server

The posture transport server MUST implement PT-TLS.

The posture transport server MUST support the use of machine certificates for TLS at each endpoint consistent with the requirements stipulated in [RFC6876] and [Server-Discovery].

4.4. Repository

EPCP requires a simple administrative interface for the repository. Posture validators on the posture manager receive the target endpoint posture information via PA-TNC [RFC5792] messages sent from corresponding posture collectors on the target endpoint. The posture validators store this information in the repository linked to the identity of the target endpoint where the posture collectors are located.

4.5. IETF SACM SWAM Extension to the IETF NEA EPCP Implementation

This section defines the requirements associated with the software asset management extension [RFC8412] to the IETF NEA EPCP implementation.

4.5.1. Endpoint Pre-Provisioning

This section defines the requirements associated with implementing SWIMA.

The following requirements assume that the platform or OS vendor supports the use of SWID tags and has identified a standard directory location for the SWID tags to be located as specified by [SWID].

4.5.2. SWID Tags

The primary content for the EPCP is the information conveyed in the elements of a SWID tag.

The endpoint **MUST** have SWID tags stored in a directory specified in [SWID]. The tags **SHOULD** be provided by the software vendor; they **MAY** also be generated by:

- o the software installer; or
- o third-party software that creates tags based on the applications it sees installed on the endpoint.

The elements in the SWID tag **MUST** be populated as specified in [SWID]. These tags, and the directory in which they are stored, **MUST** be updated as software is added, removed, or updated.

4.5.3. SWID Posture Collectors and Posture Validators

4.5.3.1. The SWID Posture Collector

For the EPCP, the SWID posture collector MUST be conformant with [RFC8412], which includes requirements for:

1. Collecting SWID tags from the SWID directory
2. Monitoring the SWID directory for changes
3. Initiating a session with the posture manager to report changes to the directory
4. Maintaining a list of changes to the SWID directory when updates take place and no PT-TLS connection can be created with the posture manager
5. Responding to a request for SWID tags from the SWID Posture Validator on the posture manager
6. Responding to a query from the SWID posture validator as to whether all updates have been sent

The SWID posture collector is not responsible for detecting that the SWID directory was not updated when an application was either installed or uninstalled.

4.5.3.2. The SWID Posture Validator

Conformance to [RFC8412] enables the SWID posture validator to:

1. Send messages to the SWID posture collector (at the behest of the administrator at the posture manager console) requesting updates for SWID tags located on endpoint
2. Ask the SWID posture collector whether all updates to the SWID directory located at the posture manager have been sent
3. Perform any validation and processing on the collected SWID posture information prior to storage

In addition to these requirements, a SWID posture validator used in conformance with this profile MUST be capable of passing this SWID posture information as well as the associated endpoint identity to the repository for storage.

4.5.4. Repository

The administrative interface SHOULD enable an administrator to:

1. Query which endpoints have reported SWID tags for a particular application
2. Query which SWID tags are installed on an endpoint
3. Query tags based on characteristics, such as vendor, publisher, etc.

5. IETF NETCONF EPCP Implementation for Network Device Endpoints

When EPCP is used, a NETCONF client that implements the posture collection manager sends a query to target network device endpoint requesting posture information over a secure channel. Once the NETCONF server on the endpoint receives the request, it queries one or more datastores for the posture information. The NETCONF server then reports the information back to the NETCONF client where it can be stored in a repository for use by other tools. This is shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3: NETCONF Components

These requirements are written with a view to performing a posture assessment on network device endpoints (routers, switches, etc.); as the EPCP grows and evolves, these requirements will be expanded to address issues that arise.

Note that these requirements refer to defined components of the NETCONF architecture and map back to EPCP. As with the NETCONF architecture, vendors have discretion as to how these NETCONF components map to separate pieces of software or endpoints.

5.1. Endpoint Provisioning

For the posture manager to be able to query the datastores on the endpoint, the endpoint MUST be configured to grant the posture manager access to its datastores as described in [RFC6241]. The posture manager is identified by its NETCONF username. The endpoint is deployed on the network.

5.2. Posture Manager Provisioning

For the posture manager to be able to query the datastores on the endpoint, the posture manager MUST be provisioned with a NETCONF username that will be used to authenticate the posture manager to the endpoint as described in [RFC6241]. The username generated will be determined by the selected transport protocol. The posture manager is deployed on the network.

5.3. Endpoint

An endpoint MUST conform to the requirements outlined for servers in the NETCONF protocol as defined in [RFC6241]. This requires the implementation of NETCONF over SSH [RFC6242]. An endpoint MAY support the NETCONF protocol over other transports such as TLS [RFC7589] as well as the RESTCONF protocol as defined in [RFC8040].

5.3.1. Datastore

A NETCONF datastore on an endpoint MUST support the operations outlined in [RFC6241], but, the actual implementation of the datastore is left to the endpoint vendor.

Datastores MUST support the YANG data modeling language [RFC7950] for expressing endpoint posture information in a structured format. In addition, datastores MAY support other data models such as XML (via YIN) for representing posture information.

Datastores MUST support the compliance posture information specified in [RFC7317]. Datastores MAY support other models standardized or proprietary as deemed appropriate by the endpoint vendor.

5.4. Posture Manager

A posture manager **MUST** conform to the requirements specified for clients in the NETCONF protocol as defined in [RFC6241]. This requires the implementation of NETCONF over SSH [RFC6242]. A posture manager **MAY** also support the NETCONF protocol over other transports such as TLS [RFC7589]. In addition, a posture manager **MAY** support the RESTCONF protocol as defined in [RFC8040].

While ad-hoc fetch/polling via NETCONF and RESTCONF is useful for assessing endpoint compliance, such solutions by themselves are not able to detect changes as they occur on the endpoint. As a result, a future revision of this document will support [I-D.ietf-netconf-yang-push] to receive updates on YANG-modeled posture information. Similarly, because not all posture information is modeled in YANG, a future revision of this document will reference [I-D.ietf-netconf-subscribed-notifications] once it is a standard to support continuous streams of unstructured data from the endpoint to the posture manager.

5.5. Repository

EPCP requires a simple administrative interface for the repository. The posture collection manager on the posture manager receives the target endpoint posture information via NETCONF [RFC6241] messages sent from posture collection engine on the target endpoint. The posture collection manager stores this information in the repository linked to the identity of the target endpoint from which it was collected.

6. Future Work

This section captures ideas for future work related to EPCP that might be of interest to the IETF SACM WG. These ideas are listed in no particular order.

- o Integrate the IETF NETCONF Yang Push architecture.
- o Add support endpoint types beyond workstations, servers, and network infrastructure devices.
- o Examine the integration of [I-D.ietf-mile-xmpp-grid].
- o Define a standard interface and API for interacting with the repository. Requirements to consider include: creating a secure channel between a publisher and the repository, creating a secure channel between a subscriber and the repository, and the types of

interactions that must be supported between publishers and subscribers to a repository.

- o Define a standard interface for communications between the posture broker client and posture transport client(s) as well as the posture broker server and posture transport server(s).
- o Retention of posture information on the target endpoint.
- o Define an orchestrator component as well as publish/subscribe interface for it.
- o Define an evaluator component as well as an interface for it.

7. Acknowledgements

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Member	Organization
Padma Krishnaswamy	Battelle Memorial Institute
Eric Fleischman	Boeing
Richard Hill	Boeing
Steven Venema	Boeing
Nancy Cam-Winget	Cisco Systems
Scott Pope	Cisco Systems
Max Pritikin	Cisco Systems
Allan Thompson	Cisco Systems
Nicolai Kuntze	Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology (SIT)
Ira McDonald	High North
Dr. Andreas Steffen	HSR University of Applied Sciences Rapperswil
Josef von Helden	Hochschule Hannover

James Tan	Infoblox
Steve Hanna (TNC-WG Co-Chair)	Juniper Networks
Cliff Kahn	Juniper Networks
Lisa Lorenzin	Juniper Networks
Atul Shah (TNC-WG Co-Chair)	Microsoft
Jon Baker	MITRE
Charles Schmidt	MITRE
Rainer Enders	NCP Engineering
Dick Wilkins	Phoenix Technologies
David Waltermire	NIST
Mike Boyle	U.S. Government
Emily Doll	U.S. Government
Jessica Fitzgerald-McKay	U.S. Government
Mary Lessels	U.S. Government
Chris Salter	U.S. Government

Table 1: Members of the TNC Work Group that Contributed to the Document

8. IANA Considerations

This document does not define any new IANA registries. However, this document does reference other documents that do define IANA registries. As a result, the IANA Considerations section of the referenced documents should be consulted.

9. Security Considerations

This Security Considerations section includes an analysis of the attacks that may be mounted against systems that implement the EPCP (Section 9.1) and the countermeasures that may be used to prevent or mitigate these attacks (Section 9.2). Overall, a substantial reduction in cyber risk can be achieved.

9.1. Threat Model

This section lists the attacks that can be mounted on a NEA implementation of an EPCP environment. The following section (Section 9.2) describes countermeasures.

Because the EPCP describes a specific use case for NEA components, many security considerations for these components are addressed in more detail in the technical specifications: [RFC8412], [IF-IMC], [RFC5793], [Server-Discovery], [RFC6876], [IF-IMV].

9.1.1. Endpoint Attacks

While the EPCP provides substantial improvements in endpoint security, endpoints can still be compromised. For this reason, all parties must regard data coming from endpoints as potentially unreliable or even malicious. An analogy can be drawn with human testimony in an investigation or trial. Human testimony is essential but must be regarded with suspicion.

- o Compromise of endpoint: A compromised endpoint may report false information to confuse or even provide maliciously crafted information with a goal of infecting others.
- o Putting bad information in SWID directory: Even if an endpoint is not completely compromised, some of the software running on it may be unreliable or even malicious. This software, potentially including the SWID generation or discovery tool, or malicious software pretending to be a SWID generation or discovery tool, can place incorrect or maliciously crafted information into the SWID directory. Endpoint users may even place such information in the directory, whether motivated by curiosity or confusion or a desire to bypass restrictions on their use of the endpoint.
- o Identity spoofing (impersonation): A compromised endpoint may attempt to impersonate another endpoint to gain its privileges or to besmirch the reputation of that other endpoint.

9.1.2. Network Attacks

A variety of attacks can be mounted using the network. Generally, the network cannot be trusted.

- o Eavesdropping, modification, injection, replay, deletion
- o Traffic analysis
- o Denial of service and blocking traffic

9.1.3. Posture Manager Attacks

The posture manager is a critical security element and therefore merits considerable scrutiny.

- o Compromised trusted manager: A compromised posture manager or a malicious party that is able to impersonate a posture manager can incorrectly grant or deny access to endpoints, place incorrect information into the repository, or send malicious messages to endpoints.
- o Misconfiguration of posture manager: Accidental or purposeful misconfiguration of a trusted posture manager can cause effects that are similar to those listed for compromised trusted posture manager.
- o Malicious untrusted posture manager: An untrusted posture manager cannot mount any significant attacks because all properly implemented endpoints will refuse to engage in any meaningful dialog with such a posture manager.

9.1.4. Repository Attacks

The repository is also an important security element and therefore merits careful scrutiny.

- o Putting bad information into trusted repository: An authorized repository client such as a server may be able to put incorrect information into a trusted repository or delete or modify historical information, causing incorrect decisions about endpoint security. Placing maliciously crafted data in the repository could even lead to compromise of repository clients, if they fail to carefully check such data.
- o Compromised trusted repository: A compromised trusted repository or a malicious untrusted repository that is able to impersonate a trusted repository can lead to effects similar to those listed for

"Putting bad information into trusted repository". Further, a compromised trusted repository can report different results to different repository clients or deny access to the repository for selected repository clients.

- o Misconfiguration of trusted repository: Accidental or purposeful misconfiguration of a trusted repository can deny access to the repository or result in loss of historical data.
- o Malicious untrusted repository: An untrusted repository cannot mount any significant attacks because all properly implemented repository clients will refuse to engage in any meaningful dialog with such a repository.

9.2. Countermeasures

This section lists the countermeasures that can be used in a NEA implementation of an EPCP environment.

9.2.1. Countermeasures for Endpoint Attacks

This profile is in and of itself a countermeasure for a compromised endpoint. A primary defense for an endpoint is to run up to date software configured to be run as safely as possible.

Ensuring that anti-virus signatures are up to date and that a firewall is configured are also protections for an endpoint that are supported by the current NEA specifications.

Endpoints that have hardware cryptographic modules that are provisioned by the enterprise, in accordance with [IEEE-802-1ar], can protect the private keys used for authentication and help prevent adversaries from stealing credentials that can be used for impersonation. Future versions of the EPCP may want to discuss in greater detail how to use a hardware cryptographic module, in accordance with [IEEE-802-1ar], to protect credentials and to protect the integrity of the code that executes during the bootstrap process.

9.2.2. Countermeasures for Network Attacks

To address network attacks, [RFC6876] includes required encryption, authentication, integrity protection, and replay protection. [Server-Discovery] also includes authorization checks to ensure that only authorized servers are trusted by endpoints. Any unspecified or not yet specified network protocols employed in the EPCP (e.g. the protocol used to interface with the repository) should include similar protections.

These protections reduce the scope of the network threat to traffic analysis and denial of service. Countermeasures for traffic analysis (e.g. masking) are usually impractical but may be employed. Countermeasures for denial of service (e.g. detecting and blocking particular sources) SHOULD be used when appropriate to detect and block denial of service attacks. These are routine practices in network security.

9.2.3. Countermeasures for Posture Manager Attacks

Because of the serious consequences of posture manager compromise, posture managers SHOULD be especially well hardened against attack and minimized to reduce their attack surface. They SHOULD be monitored using the NEA protocols to ensure the integrity of the behavior and analysis data stored on the posture manager and SHOULD utilize an [IEEE-802-1ar]-compliant hardware cryptographic module for identity and/or integrity measurements of the posture manager. They should be well managed to minimize vulnerabilities in the underlying platform and in systems upon which the posture manager depends. Network security measures such as firewalls or intrusion detection systems may be used to monitor and limit traffic to and from the posture manager. Personnel with administrative access to the posture manager should be carefully screened and monitored to detect problems as soon as possible. Posture manager administrators should not use password-based authentication but should instead use non-reusable credentials and multi-factor authentication (where available). Physical security measures should be employed to prevent physical attacks on posture managers.

To ease detection of posture manager compromise, should it occur, posture manager behavior should be monitored to detect unusual behavior (such as a server reboot, unusual traffic patterns, or other odd behavior). Endpoints should log and/or notify users and/or administrators when peculiar posture manager behavior is detected. To aid forensic investigation, permanent read-only audit logs of security-relevant information pertaining to posture manager (especially administrative actions) should be maintained. If posture manager compromise is detected, the posture manager's certificate should be revoked and careful analysis should be performed of the source and impact of this compromise. Any reusable credentials that may have been compromised should be reissued.

Endpoints can reduce the threat of server compromise by minimizing the number of trusted posture managers, using the mechanisms described in [Server-Discovery].

9.2.4. Countermeasures for Repository Attacks

If the host for the repository is located on its own endpoint, it should be protected with the same measures taken to protect the posture manager. In this circumstance, all messages between the posture manager and repository should be protected with a mature security protocol such as TLS or IPsec.

The repository can aid in the detection of compromised endpoints if an adversary cannot tamper with its contents. For instance, if an endpoint reports that it does not have an application with a known vulnerability installed, an administrator can check whether the endpoint might be lying by querying the repository for the history of what applications were installed on the endpoint.

To help prevent tampering with the information in the repository:

1. Only authorized parties should have privilege to run code on the endpoint and to change the repository.
2. If a separate endpoint hosts the repository, then the functionality of that endpoint should be limited to hosting the repository. The firewall on the repository should only allow access to the posture manager and to any endpoint authorized for administration.
3. The repository should ideally use "write once" media to archive the history of what was placed in the repository, to include a snapshot of the current status of applications on endpoints.

10. Privacy Considerations

The EPCP specifically addresses the collection of posture data from enterprise endpoints by an enterprise network. As such, privacy is not going to often arise as a concern for those deploying this solution.

A possible exception may be the concerns a user may have when attempting to connect a personal endpoint (such as a phone or mobile endpoint) to an enterprise network. The user may not want to share certain details, such as an endpoint identifier or SWID tags, with the enterprise. The user can configure their NEA client to reject requests for this information; however, it is possible that the enterprise policy will not allow the user's endpoint to connect to the network without providing the requested data.

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Appendix A. Rationale for an EPCP Solution

A.1. Preventative Posture Assessments

The value of continuous endpoint posture assessment is well established. Security experts have identified asset management and vulnerability remediation as a critical step for preventing intrusions. Application whitelisting, patching applications and operating systems, and using the latest versions of applications top the Defense Signals Directorate's "Top 4 Mitigations to Protect Your ICT System". [DSD] "Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Endpoints", "Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software", and "Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation" are Controls 1, 2, and 3, respectively, of the CIS Controls [CIS]. While there are commercially available solutions that attempt to address these security controls, these solutions do not run on all types of endpoints; consistently interoperate with other tools that could make use of the data collected; collect posture information from all types of endpoints in a consistent, standardized schema; or require vetted,

standardized protocols that have been evaluated by the international community for cryptographic soundness.

As is true of most solutions offered today, the solution found in the EPCP does not attempt to solve the lying endpoint problem, or detect infected endpoints; rather, it focuses on ensuring that healthy endpoints remain healthy by keeping software up-to-date and patched.

A.2. All Network-Connected Endpoints are Endpoints

As defined by [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology], an endpoint is any physical or virtual computing endpoint that can be connected to a network. Posture assessment against policy is equally, if not more, important for continuously connected endpoints, such as enterprise workstations and infrastructure endpoints, as it is for sporadically connected endpoints. Continuously connected endpoints are just as likely to fall out of compliance with policy, and a standardized posture assessment method is necessary to ensure they can be properly handled.

A.3. All Endpoints on the Network Must be Uniquely Identified

Many administrators struggle to identify what endpoints are connected to the network at any given time. By requiring a standardized method of endpoint identity, the EPCP will enable administrators to answer the basic question, "What is on my network?" In [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology], SACM defines this set of endpoints on the network as the SACM domain. Unique endpoint identification also enables the comparison of current and past endpoint posture assessments, by allowing administrators to correlate assessments from the same endpoint. This makes it easier to flag suspicious changes in endpoint posture for manual or automatic review, and helps to swiftly identify malicious changes to endpoint applications.

A.4. Standardized Data Models

Meeting EPCP best practices requires the use of standardized data models for the exchange of posture information. This helps to ensure that the posture information sent from endpoints to the repository can be easily stored, due to their known format, and shared with authorized endpoints and users.

Posture information must be sent over standardized protocols to ensure the confidentiality and authenticity of this data while in transit. Implementations of the EPCP include [RFC6876] and [RFC6241] for communication between the target endpoint and the posture manager. These protocols allow networks that implement this solution to collect large amounts of posture information from an endpoint to

make decisions about that endpoint's compliance with some policy. The EPCP offers a solution for all endpoints already connected to the network. Periodic assessments and automated reporting of changes to endpoint posture allow for instantaneous identification of connected endpoints that are no longer compliant to some policy.

A.5. Posture Information Must Be Stored

Posture information must be stored by the repository and must be exposed to an interface at the posture manager. Standard data models enable standard queries from an interface exposed to an administrator at the posture manager console. A repository must retain any current posture information retrieved from the target endpoint and store it indexed by the unique identifier for the endpoint. Any posture collection manager specified by this profile must be able to ascertain from its corresponding posture collection engine whether the posture information is up to date. An interface on the posture manager must support a request to obtain up-to-date information when an endpoint is connected. This interface must also support the ability to make a standard set of queries about the posture information stored by the repository. In the future, some forms of posture information might be retained at the endpoint. The interface on the posture manager must accommodate the ability to make a request to the corresponding posture collection engine about the posture of the target endpoint. Standard data models and protocols also enable the security of posture assessment results. By storing these results indexed under the endpoint's unique identification, secure storage itself enables endpoint posture information correlation, and ensures that the enterprise's repositories always offer the freshest, most up-to-date view of the enterprise's endpoint posture information possible.

A.6. Posture Information Can Be Shared

By exposing posture information using a standard interface and API, other security and operational components have a high level of insight into the enterprise's endpoints and the software installed on them. This will support innovation in the areas of asset management, vulnerability scanning, and administrative interfaces, as any authorized infrastructure endpoint can interact with the posture information.

A.7. Enterprise Asset Posture Information Belongs to the Enterprise

Owners and administrators must have complete control of posture information, policy, and endpoint mitigation. Standardized data models, protocols and interfaces help to ensure that this posture information is not locked in proprietary databases, but is made

available to its owners. This enables administrators to develop as nuanced a policy as necessary to keep their networks secure. Of course, there may be exceptions to this such as the case with privacy-related information (e.g., personally identifiable information).

Appendix B. EPCP Supported Use Cases and Non-Supported Use Cases

B.1. Supported Use Cases

The following sections describe the different use cases supported by the EPCP.

B.1.1. Hardware Asset Management

Using the administrative interface on the posture manager, an authorized user can learn:

- o what endpoints are connected to the network at any given time; and
- o what SWID tags were reported for the endpoints.

The ability to answer these questions offers a standards-based approach to asset management, which is a vital part of enterprise processes such as compliance report generation for the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), etc.

B.1.2. Software Asset Management

The administrative interface on the posture manager provides the ability for authorized users and infrastructure to know which software is installed on which endpoints on the enterprise's network. This allows the enterprise to answer questions about what software is installed to determine if it is licensed or prohibited. This information can also drive other use cases such as:

- o vulnerability management: knowing what software is installed supports the ability to determine which endpoints contain vulnerable software and need to be patched.
- o configuration management: knowing which security controls need to be applied to harden installed software and better protect endpoints.

B.1.3. Vulnerability Management

The administrative interface also provides the ability for authorized users or infrastructure to locate endpoints running software for which vulnerabilities have been announced. Because of

1. the unique IDs assigned to each endpoint; and
2. the rich application data provided in the endpoints' posture information,

the repository can be queried to find all endpoints running a vulnerable application. Endpoints suspected of being vulnerable can be addressed by the administrator or flagged for further scrutiny.

B.1.4. Threat Detection and Analysis

The repository's standardized API allows authorized infrastructure endpoints and software to search endpoint posture assessment information for evidence that an endpoint's software inventory has changed, and can make endpoint software inventory data available to other endpoints. This automates security data sharing in a way that expedites the correlation of relevant network data, allowing administrators and infrastructure endpoints to identify odd endpoint behavior and configuration using secure, standards-based data models and protocols.

B.2. Non-Supported Use Cases

Several use cases, including but not limited to these, are not covered by the EPCP:

- o Gathering non-standardized types of posture information: The EPCP does not prevent administrators from collecting posture information in proprietary formats from the endpoint; however it does not set requirements for doing so.
- o Solving the lying endpoint problem: The EPCP does not address the lying endpoint problem; the Profile makes no assertions that it can catch an endpoint that is, either maliciously or accidentally, reporting false posture information to the posture manager. However, other solutions may be able to use the posture information collected using the capabilities described in this profile to catch an endpoint in a lie. For example, a sensor may be able to compare the posture information it has collected on an endpoint's activity on the network to what the endpoint reported to the server and flag discrepancies. However, these capabilities are not described in this profile.

Appendix C. Endpoint Posture Collection Profile Examples

The following subsections provide examples of the EPCP as implemented using components from the NEA architecture.

C.1. Continuous Posture Assessment of an Endpoint




Figure 4: Continuous Posture Assessment of an Endpoint

C.1.1. Change on Endpoint Triggers Posture Assessment

A new application is installed on the endpoint, and the SWID directory is updated. This triggers an update from the SWID posture collector to the SWID posture validator. The message is sent down the NEA stack, encapsulated by NEA protocols until it is sent by the posture transport client to the posture transport server. The posture transport server then forwards it up through the stack, where the layers of encapsulation are removed until the SWID Message arrives at the SWID posture validator.




Figure 5: Compliance Protocol Encapsulation

The SWID posture validator stores the new tag information in the repository. If the tag indicates that the endpoint is compliant to the policy, then the process is complete until the next time an update is needed (either because policy states that the endpoint must submit posture assessment results periodically or because an install/uninstall/update on the endpoint triggers a posture assessment).




Figure 6: Storing SWIDs in the Repository

If the endpoint has fallen out of compliance with a policy, the posture manager can alert the administrator via the posture manager’s administrative interface. The administrator can then take steps to address the problem. If the administrator has already established a policy for automatically addressing this problem, that policy will be followed.




Figure 7: Server Alerts Network Admin

C.2. Administrator Searches for Vulnerable Endpoints

An announcement is made that a particular version of a piece of software has a vulnerability. The administrator uses the administrative interface on the server to search the repository for endpoints that reported the SWID tag for the vulnerable software.




Figure 8: Admin Searches for Vulnerable Endpoints

The repository returns a list of entries in the matching the administrator’s search. The administrator can then address the vulnerable endpoints by taking some follow-up action such as removing it from the network, quarantining it, or updating the vulnerable software.

Appendix D. Change Log

D.1. -03 to -04

Addressed various comments from the SACM WG.

Refactored the document to better focus it on the communications between endpoints and the posture manager and the best practices for EPCP implementations.

Made other editorial changes and improved consistency throughout the document.

D.2. -02 to -03

Addressed various comments from the SACM WG.

Added a reference to TCG ECP 1.0.

Removed text in the "SWID Posture Validator" section that states it performs evaluation. This was removed because it contradicts the posture manager not performing any evaluations.

Expanded the "Provisioning" section of the "EPCP Transactions" section to include examples of endpoint identifiers and the need to provision endpoints with components and data models.

Combined text for the capabilities of the Administrative Interface and API.

Removed superfluous and introductory text from the "Security Considerations" section.

Renamed section "Vulnerability Searches" to Vulnerability Management".

Changed I-D category to BCP.

Changed references to the NETMOD architecture to the NETCONF architecture because NETCONF represents the management protocol whereas NETMOD is focused on the definition of data models.

Addressed various editorial suggestions.

D.3. -01 to -02

Addressed various comments from the SACM WG.

Added a section for the collection of posture information from network devices using standards from the NETMOD WG.

Updated EPCP component diagrams so they were not specific to a NEA-based implementation.

Updated EPCP NEA example diagrams to reflect all the components in the NEA architecture.

D.4. -00 to -01

There are no textual changes associated with this revision. This revision simply reflects a resubmission of the document so that it remains in active status.

D.5. -01 to -02

Added references to the Software Inventory Message and Attributes (SWIMA) for PA-TNC I-D.

Replaced references to PC-TNC with IF-IMC.

Removed erroneous hyphens from a couple of section titles.

Made a few minor editorial changes.

D.6. -02 to -00

Draft adopted by IETF SACM WG.

D.7. -00 to -01

Significant edits to up-level the draft to describe SACM collection over multiple different protocols.

Replaced references to SANS with CIS.

Made other minor editorial changes.

Authors' Addresses

Danny Haynes
The MITRE Corporation
202 Burlington Road
Bedford, MA 01730
USA

Email: dhaynes@mitre.org

Jessica Fitzgerald-McKay
Department of Defense
9800 Savage Road
Ft. Meade, Maryland
USA

Email: jmfitz2@nsa.gov

Lisa Lorenzin
Pulse Secure
2700 Zanker Rd., Suite 200
San Jose, CA 95134
US

Email: llorenzin@pulsesecure.net